In Kant’s philosophy, sense data stand at a very short distance from plurality when entering the faculty of understanding; however, they are not completely ready yet for the application and use of apriori forms of understanding. Since these forms perform an act similar to conceptualization, an intermediary is in fact needed to provide these sense data for the application of apriori forms. Kant believes that this intermediary is nothing but the faculty of imagination. The task of this faculty is what he technically calls “schamatism”. In fact, the faculty of imagination tries to create a kind of unity and connection between the faculty of sensation and the faculty of understanding which bear no similarity to each other. According to Heidegger, the relation between the cooperation of the faculties of sensation and understanding or, in other words, time and categories to its components is completely aposteriori rather than apriori. In man’s opposition to his relation, what enjoys precedence is non-being, which means that, in Heidegger’s view, the most principal ontological question is: why are things in existence instead of being non-existent? Schematism is principally for human beings and does not belong to an external object. This denotes that any knowledge of existents requires a kind of pre-knowledge. In Heidegger’s view, imagination is the main faculty of knowledge, and sensation and understanding are also rooted in imagination. Moreover, imagination is also related to time, and that is why it is the root and origin of metaphysics. In other words, both the theoretical reason and practical reason are rooted in imagination. Consequently, we can say that Heidegger generally tries to promote the level of Kant’s epistemological discussions to the level of ontology. Heidegger believes that the transcendental idea refers to a position that determines the prerequisites of the possibility of knowledge. He maintains that concepts are pure ontological manifestations and not merely some mental pheNOMENa.